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Abstract 
This article explores the possibility and significance of a transjudicial 
dialogue on human rights by examining recent benchmark decision by the 
Supreme Court of Japan on 4 September 2013， which admits to unconstitu-
tional provision of the Civil Code that allows unequal allocation of inheritance 
between a child born in wedlock and one born out of wedlock. Passing an 
epoch-making decision， the Court for the first time consulted not only the 
legal reforms of foreign countries such as France and Germany concerning the 
legal status of the child born out of wedlock but also views and recommenda-
tions made by the Human Rights Committee and Committee on the Rights of 
the Child concerning the legal status of the child born out of wedlock. 
The article d日scribesthe situation before the 2013 Decision and scrutinizes 
the reasoning of the decision in order to evaluate its significance_ It then 
elaborates on two factors where transjudicial dialogue occurs: (1) in reference 
to foreign law and case law， and the international human rights treaty and (2) 
in refcrence to views and recommendations of international bodies. Lastly， it
explores the relationship between foreign law and international law， which 
are intertwined in the field of human rights. 
Th巴articlereaches three broad conclusions: (1) The Supreme Court of 
Japan finally shifted its attitude from non-reference to reference (clear refer-
ence to foreign law in order to fortify its conclusion); (2) its reference to for-
eign law and international human ri広htstreaties could provide a new sphere 
where foreign law and international human rights treaties are hybridized; and 
(3) some questions and problems remain before true transjudicial dialogue. 
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1n trod uction 
1. Situation before Decision of 4 September 2013 
2. Decision of 4 September 2013 
3. Use of Foreign Product 
(1) Use of Foreign Law and Case Law 
(2) Use of 1nternational Law and Case Law 
4. Relationship between the Foreign Law and 1nternational Law 
in the Field of Human Rights 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
Academic attention to transjudicial (or globaI) dialogue， conversa-
tion or communication has flourished over the past two decades.l Discus-
sion (and debate) took place first in Anglo-American jurisprudence.2 
1 Anne-Marie Slaugh胞に‘ATypology of Transjudicial Communication' (1994) 
29 University 01 Richmond Law Review 9; Christopher McCrudden， 'ACommon 
Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitu-
tional Rights' (2000) 20 (4) Oxlord ]ournal 01 Legal Studies 499; Sarah K. 
Harding， 'Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review' (2003) 28 Yale ]ournal 
ollnternational Law 409; Ruth Bader Ginsburg，“‘A Decent Respect to the Opin-
ions of [Human] kind": the Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitu-
tional Adjudication' (2005) 64 (3) Cambridge Law ]ournal 575; Cheryl 
Saunders，‘The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law' (2006) 13 
lndiana ]ournal 01 Global Legal Studies 37; Cheryl Saunders， 'Comparative Con-
stitutional Law in the Courts: 1s There a Problem?' (2006) Current Legal Prob-
lems 91; Robert Reed，官oreignPrecedents and J udicial Reasoning: The 
American Debatc and British Practice' (2008) 124 LaωQuarterly Review 253; 
Vicki Jackson， Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (OUP， 2010); 
David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang，‘The Limits of Global ]udicial Dialogue' 
OUP， (2011) 86 Washington Law Revieω523; Eyal Benvenisti and George W 
Downs，‘The Democratizing Effects of Transjudicial Coordination' (2012) 8 
Utrecht laωReview 158; Gabor Halmai， The Use of Foreign Law in Constitu-
tional 1nterpretation， in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds.)， Oxlord 
Handbook 01 Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP， 2012) 1328. 
2 Harold Hongju Koh， 'On American Exceptiona1ism、(2003)Stanlord Law Re-
view 1479， 1513; Austen L. Parrish，‘Storm in a Teacup: The US Supreme 
Court's us巴ofForeign Law' (2007) University 01 Ilinois Law Review 637. The 
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Therefore this could be attributed to the case law system tradition. More 
recently， however， the topic has spread to the European continent and 
elsewhere. There are reasons for this phenomenon. One of the main rea-
sons lies in European integration， including the strong influence of Euro-
pean courts (EU Courts and the European Court of Human Rights) whose 
judgments have binding effect. Mutual interactions between European 
courts and national courts necessitate mutual references.3 Some newly 
democratized or r・e-democratizedcountries frequently refer to foreign 
constitutionallaw on account of the recent “borrowing".' There are more 
and more opportunities for national， regional and international judges to 
exchange views outside the court.5 After al national courts are major 
providers for regional and international judges. The abve factors are 
intertwined in reality. Moreover the development of technology and 
debate attracted the Japanese scholars. As one of the examples， see Mini-
symposium on Reference and Recourse to Foreign Law and International Law 
by the Supreme Court of the United States， (2009) 71 Hikakuho Kenkyu [Com-
parative Law Journal] 10. 
3 It is necessary to cxamine whethcr these references facilitate national courts 
to refer to foreign pr巴cedents，i.c. judgments of foreign courts. 
4 Vlad Perju， Constitutional Transplants， Borrowing， and Migrations， inMichel 
Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds.)， Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitu-
tionα1 Law (2012， Oxford University Press) 1304. 
5 A good exampl日isthe World Conference on Constitutional Justicc， which 
united 85 constitutional courts in the world. (http://www.venice.coe.intjWeb 
Formsjpagesj?p=02_ WCCJ> (accessed 25 January 2014). The Statute of the 
World Conference on Constitutional Justice provides its objectives as follows: 
Article 1. Objectives 
(1) The World Conference on Constitutional Justice (“the W orld Confer-
ence") promotes constitutional justice -understood as constitutional review 
including human rights case-law -as a key clement for democracy， the pro-
tection of human rights and the rule of law. 
(2) The World Conference aims to achieve these objectives by: 
-organising regular Congresses uniting al members on a global scale; 
-participating in regional conferences and seminars; 
-promoting the exchange of cxperiences and case-law within the regional 
and linguistic groups， between them and with individual members; 
-offering good offices to its members upon their request; 
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globalization of academic institutes allow scholars to communicate across 
borders. 
The dialogue literature is stil1 in a nascent stage and it has to be ex-
amined and refined in order to produce useful results.' First， does 
transjudicial dialogue really occur and if so， where and to what extent? 
These questions reguire answers based on the statistical evidence. Sec-
ond， isit possible to achieve a theory that can explain why dialogue does 
or does not take place? Third， lessons learned from the US experience， 
demonstrate that the legitimacy question regarding transjudicial dia-
logue should be explored. 
The first question was recently tackled by a comparative research 
that examined 16 national courts that were divided into two groups: 
courts that often resort to foreign precedents (the High Court of Austra-
lia， the Supreme Court of Canada， the Supreme Court of India， the Su-
preme Court of Ireland， The Supreme Court of Israel， the Supreme Court 
of Namibia and the Constitutional Court of South Africa) and courts that 
only rarely cite such precedents (the Constitutional Court of Austria， the 
Constitutional Court of Germany， the Constitutional Court of Hungary， 
the Supreme Court of ]apan， the Supreme Court of Mexico， the Constitu-
tional Court of Romania， the Constitutional Court of Russia， the Constitu-
tional Court of Taiwan and the Supreme Court of the United States).' 
The second question calls for a comprehensive empirical analysis that 
covers al forms of world constitutions. The aforementioned research， by 
contrasting the two groups， contributes by providing not only compara-
tive individual data but also， toa certain degree， categorizations that help 
explain why a reference is made or not. For example， research shows the 
importance of a country's legal tradition. 
The third question applies to every court that uses foreign prece-
dents. It is interesting to note that the question of legitimacy first arose 
6 McCrudden， supra note 1， 532. 
7 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau， The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing， 2013). 
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in the United States whose jurisprudence is constantly used by some for-
eign courts. Moreover， the legitimacy question has recently become the 
subject of academic discussions in Japan.8 With the Grand Bench Cherein-
after GB) decision passed on 4 September 2012 by the Supreme Court of 
Japan Chereinafter SCJ) referring to foreign law， itis time to take the 
issu日moreseriously. 
1n an attempt to tackle the above questions， the author previously 
examined the use of foreign precedents by the SC].9 The research covers 
the period between 1 January 1990 and 31 July 2008 including the GB judg-
ment of 4 June 2008 Chereinafter the 2008 Judgment).1O The quantitative 
result shows that there is no explicit citation of foreign case law or for-
eign law in majority of the judgments and decisions made by the 
SC].1l A qualitative approach， however， reveals a hidden attitude within 
the SCJ， which is interested in foreign law and case law， because some 
constitutional judgments and decisions show similarities with the judg-
ments and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States Chereinaf-
ter SCUS) with respect to the reasoning and testing of constitutional-
8 Tatsuhiko Yamamoto， Kenpou Soshou ni okeru Gaikokuhou Sanshou no 
Sahou， inJunko Kotani et al (edよGendaiAmerika no ShihouωKenpou 
(Shogakusha， 2013) 316 and HajimeYamamoto， Gurobaruka Sekai to Jinken 
Hougenron no Tenkai， inKotani， ibid.， 344. 
9 Akiko Ejima， A Gap between the Apparent and Hidden Attitudes of the Su-
preme Court of Japan towards Foreign Precedents， inGroppi and Ponthoreau， 
supra note 7. It does not include the international human rights treaties and 
views of the committees created by the treaties due to the general policy of 
the whole research on which the book is based. The earlier time just after the 
SCJ began to work when few exceptional references could be seen (Marbury 
v. Madison (1803) in the judgment of the SCJ， 8 July 1948，2 (8) Minshu 801 and 
a general brief overview of foreign judicial review in the judgment of the SCJ 
(GB)， 8 October 1952， 6 (9) Minshu 783) could be seen is not covered by my 
research 
10 Judgment of the SCJ (GB) ， 4 June 2008， 62 (6) Minshu 1367 
1 An explicit citation means a ful case citation including the name of the case; 
the published sources in which it may be found， ifany; the name of the court; 
and the year of the decision or judgment. 
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ity.12 In fact， chosakan (Jaw clerks who are career judges and selected by 
the Secretariat of the SCJ) sometimes carry out a comparative research 
while assisting the SCJ， ifnecessary.13 
The GB Decision of 4 September 2013 Chereinafter the 2013 Decision)， 
by the SCJ presents an opportunity to describe the attitude held by the 
SCJ differently. The 2013 Decision， which unanimously admits unconsti-
tutionality of Article 900， item Civ) of the Civil Code for the first time not 
only refers to legal reforms of foreign countries such as France and Ger-
many concerning the legal status of the child born out of wedlock Cinclud-
ing the specific names of particular laws) but also presents the views and 
recommendations of international organizations on the legal status of the 
child born out of wedlock.14 Given the SCJ's long history of adjudication 
and previous cautious attitude on this matter before the 2013 Decision， it
is interesting to evaluate how much impact a reference to foreign product 
such as foreign law and the views of international bodies can have on the 
reasoning and conclusion of unconstitutionality. Moreover， there is an 
indirect influence from the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights， as a legal reform in Europe occures as a consequ巴nceof Stras-
bourg case law.15 
It seems that the SCJ revealed these hidden attitudes after the 2013 
Decision was enacted. Does this mean that the SCJ has finally made its 
debut acknowledgement of the transnational judicial community? It ap-
12 For more detail see Ejima， supra note 9， 290. Moreover， A law clerk at the SCJ 
who was in charge of assisting in the preparation of the judgment of 20 April 
1975 suggested the influence of the case law of the German Constitutional 
Court. Tomizawa， (1975) Saikou Saibansho Hanrei Kaisetsu Minjihen [Com-
mentaries on the case law of the SCJ， Civil CasesJ 208. 
13 Commentaries on the major important judgments and decisions of the SCJ are 
written by chosakan who are in charge of assistance of a particular case is 
regularly published in Saikou Saibansho Hanrei Kaisetsu. 
14 Decision of the SCJ (GB)， 4 September 2013 (http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/ 
pdf/20130904154932.pdf) Cvisited 10 December 2013). The printed version wil 
be published in Minshu. 
15 See， e.g. Marckx v. Belgium， Inze v. Austria， Mazurek v. France and Fabris v. 
France. 
-144一
Emerging Transjudicial Dialogue on Human Rights in ]apan 
pears that it has at 1east shifted its attitude from one of disguised indiffer-
ence to one of increased openness. Moreover， taken together with the 2013 
Decision， the 2008 Judgment can be reappraised as a harbinger of the 2013 
Decision. 
This article explores the significance and possibilities presented by 
the transjudicial dialogue on human rights through analysis of the 2013 
Decision and a1so explains why the 2013 Decision is so revolutionary 
through a camparison with the situation prior Cincluding the 2008 Judg-
ment of the Supreme Court as a harbinger case) to the 2013 Decision. It 
then explores the reasoning behind the 2013 Decision in order to evaluate 
its impact and connotations. It then elaborates on two factors， in which 
transjudicial dia10gue occurs: in reference to foreign 1aw and case law， and 
in reference to the international human rights treaty and views and rec-
ommendations of international bodies. Finally， itexplores the relation-
ship between foreign law and international law， which are intertwined 
within the field of human rights. 
1. Situation before the Decision of 4 September 2013 
The proviso to Artic1e 900， item Civ) of the Civil Code， which provides 
that the share of the inheritance owed to a child born out of wedlock shall 
be one half of thc share of the inheritance owed to a child born in wedlock 
Chereinafter this part shall be referred to as the “Provision") allowed une-
qual allocation of inheritance between the “legitimate" and “illegitimate" 
child. It was one of the fcw clear legal distinctions that remained in the 
Civil Code after Wor1d War I， when Japan introduced the Constitution of 
Japan (1946) as a complete1y new set of the constitution.16 The new Con-
16 Although the amendment clause of the Meiji Constitution (the former consti. 
tution) was used， a major academic view is that a connection between th巴
present constitution as the Constitution of ]apan and the Meiji Constitution is 
curtailed. This is because the essential principles of the present constitution 
such as popular sovereignty， human rights， and pacifism are not compatible 
with the former constitution. 
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stitution necessitated large-scale legal reforms to make statutes compati-
ble with the Constitution. Parts IV (Relatives) and V CInheritance) of the 
Civil Code were largely replaced by new clauses， because the former 
clauses were founded on the traditional family system， which contradicts 
the new Constitution on the basis of respect for individuals and equal-
ity.17 Therefore， unconstitutionality of the Provision had already been 
discussed at the Diet (the legislature in Japan). Since then， the issue has 
been fought at court while the Provision remained in the statute book.18 
The previous precedent of the SCJ was the GB decision of 5 July 1995 
(hereinafter the 1995 Decision).19 It ruled that the Provision can not be 
regarded as going beyond the bounds of reasonable discretion vested in 
the legislature and that it therefore cannot be deemed to be in violation of 
Article 14， paragraph (1) of the Constitution. Thereafter the Petty Bench 
(hereinafter PB) decisions of the SCJ followed the 1995 Decision.20 
However， the question of constitutionality was not unanimous. The 
1995 Decision itself contained five dissenting opinions and the following 
PB decisions were always accompanied by dissenting opinions. A lower 
court ruled that the Provision is unconstitutional as it enables the disad-
vantageous treatmcnt of children born out of wedlock on the grounds 
17 In the traditional family system， called as Ie-Seido (a patriarchal household)， 
the eldest son inherits al of the household property and takes care of other 
members of the household， particularly his parents 
18 An original draft of the present Article 24 of the Constitution of Japan， which 
protects equality between men and women， and contains some related protec-
tions， held a clause to abolish discrimination against children born out of 
wedlock. It was drafted by an American woman whose main concern was the 
unequal and therefore deplorable status of Japanese women that she knew as 
she lived in Tokyo before WWII as a young girl. However， itwas deleted 
because her boss of the GHQ thought that the matter should be written in the 
Civil Code and that the Constitution should be general and concise. It was 
ironic that the Civil Code itself kept the discrimination for a long time and the 
Constitution itself could not change until 2013. 
19 Decision of SCJ (GB)， 5 July 1995，49 (7) Minshu 1789. 
20 When the SCJ changes its precedent， a Petty Bench transfers the case in ques-
tion to the GB (plenary court). There are three Petty Benches each of which 
comprises four to five justices. 
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that he or she cannot change by his or her will or efforts.21 
The 2008 Judgment is worth exp10ring to examine the change in the 
2013 Decision. The 2008 Judgment declared that Article 3， paragraph (1) 
of the Nationality Act (prior to the revision by Act No. 88 of 2008)， which 
provided for different ru1es for the treatment of children born out of wed-
lock from that of children born in wed10ck in terms of acquisition of Japa-
nese nationality， had been in vio1ation of Artic1e 14， paragraph (1) of the 
Constitution. It shou1d be highlighted that the majority opinion of the 
SCJ emphasized the importance of nationa1ity as“the qua1ification for 
being a member of the State of Japan" and “an important 1ega1 status that 
means a 10t to peop1e in order to enjoy the guarantee of fundamenta1 
human rights， obtain pub1ic positions or receive public benefits in 
Japan". Moreover， itadmitted that“whether or not a child can acquire the 
status of a child born in wed10ck as a result of the marriage of the parents 
is a matter that depends on an act re1ating to the persona1 status of 
the parents， which cannot be affected by the child's own intention or 
efforts勺2 This argument is similar to the views expressed through the 
dissenting opinions of the SCJ and through decision of the aforemen.陶
tioned 10wer court. 
The main impetus that influences on the reasoning of the 2008 Judg-
ment can be attributed to changes in the socially accepted views and so開
cia1 circumstances in Japan， which weakened the reasonab1eness of the 
differentia1 treatment anshrined in the Nationality Act. It he1d that it is 
not a1ways re1evant to the realities of family life today to claim that a 
child born to a Japanese father and foreign mother has close ties with 
Japan to a sufficient extent that he or she may be granted Japanese na-
tionality， but on1y after the Japanese father becomes 1egally married to 
the non-Japanese mother. Before reaching the conclusion， the SCJ major-
ity opinion added numerous factors. Among them is a 1ega1 trend present 
in other countries and internationa1 human rights treaties that shou1d be 
21 Decision of the Tokyo High Court， 23June 1993， 1465 Hanrei Jihou 5. 
2 The 2008 Judgment， supra note 10. Emphasis is added by the author. 
-147一
法科大学院論集第 14号
highlighted for the purposes of the present article. 
In addition， itseems that other foreign countries are moving toward 
scrapping discriminatory treatment by law against children born 
out of wedlock， and in fact， the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child， 
which Japan has ratified， also contain such provisions to the effect 
that children shall not be subject to discrimination of any kind be-
cause of birth. Furthermore， after the provision of Article 3， para. 1 of 
the Nationality Act was established， many states that had previously 
required legitimation for granting nationality to children born out of 
wedlock to fathers who are their citizens have revised their laws in 
order to grant nationality if， and without any other requirement， itis 
found that the father-child relationship with their citizens is estab-
lished as a result of acknowledgement.23 
Why did the SCJ use the expression “foreign countries" (shog，似たoku
in Japanese) rather than naming individual countries as the Decision 2013 
did for its reference to Germany and France? It is unthinkable that the 
SCJ does not possess the research ability to specify the countries where 
the elimination of discriminatory treatment occurred. Moreover， the 
counsel for the appellant provided relevant foreign law andjor case law to 
the SCJ. Therefore it is more plausible that the SCJ possessed the detailed 
information but withheld it for unknown reason. Why was this informa-
tion withheld? Although this withholding was probably unintentionally 
the reference to foreign law was viewed less serious than the 2013 Deci-
sion because foreign law was not the main sorce of reasoning but a sup-
porting one. This is the difference between the 2008 Judgment and the 
2013 Decision. More importantly， ifthe SCJ were hostile to foreign law， as
23 Ibid. Emphasis is added by the author. English translations of the cssential 
judgments and decisions of the SCJ are available at (http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
eng!ish/judgmentsjindex.html). Although it is listed on the website of the 
SCJ， itis noted that it is unofficial translation. 
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are some Justices of the SCUS， itwou1d not have mentioned 1ega1 reform 
in foreign countries in its judgment. Therefore， itcan be deduced that 
that the SCJ is at the very 1east favorab1e to foreign 1aw. 1 shall exp10re 
later why the Decision 2013 refers specifically to the 1aws of Germany and 
France. 
The 1egis1ature has been so re1uctant to amend the Provision that it 
on1y de1eted the proviso after the 2013 Decision. A number of attempts 
were made in vain. In 1979， the Counsellor's Office of the Civi1 Affairs 
Bureau of the恥1inistryof Justice re1eased a draft outline of the Civil Code 
revision re1ating to inheritance， inwhich the office called to e1iminate the 
discriminatory treatment between chi1dren born in wed10ck and those 
born out of wed1ock. This comes as a resu1t of deliberations made at the 
Persona1 Status Law Subcommittee of the Civil Law Committee， part of 
the Legis1ative Counci1 of the Ministry of Justice. The same Legis1ative 
Council reported an outline of a bil for partia1 revision of the Civil Code 
to the Minister of Justice in 1996. In these documents， itwas clearly stated 
that the statutory share in inheritance shou1d be equalized for both cate-
gories of children. Furthermore， in2010 the government prepared a revi-
sion bil addressing the same point as the abovementioned bil with a 
view to submitting it to the Diet. None of these attempts， however， actu-
ally reached the Diet. 
2. Decision of 4 September 2013 
With regards to the estate of P， who died in July 2001， the appellees 
who are P's children born in wed10ck filed a petition for a ruling on the 
division of P's estate against the appellants， who are P's children born out 
of wedlock. Re1ying on the 1995 Decision， the court of prior instance， the 
Tokyo High Court， determined that the Provision was not in vio1ation of 
Article 14， paragraph (1) of the Constitution， and concluded that P's estate 
should be divided bascd on the respective statutory shares in inheritance 
of the appellees and the appellants as ca1culated by app1ying the Provi-
sion. The appellants argued that the Provision is in violation of Article 14， 
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paragraph (1) of the Constitution and therefore void. The SCJ (GB) 
quashed the decision of the Tokyo High Court by concluding that the 
Provision was in violation of Article 14， paragraph (1) of the Constitution 
as of July 2001 at the latest. Therefore， itis necessary to compare the 1995 
Decision and 2013 Decision to examine on what points they differ. 
Both decisions are based on the same criteria for consistency with 
Article 14， paragraph (1) of the Constitution， which was estab!ished by 
the precedent ru!ings. In short， the Constitution prohibits “discrimination 
not based upon reasonable grounds."24 The 2013 Decision refers to the SCJ 
GB judgments of 27 May 1964 (hereinafter the 1964 Judgment) and 4 April 
1973 (hereinafter the 1973 Judgment). The 1973 Judgment， which invali-
dates Article 200 of the Criminal Code， has been considered one of the 
most important precedents concerning the interpretation of Article 14 of 
the Constitution (equality under the law).25 On the other hand， the 1995 
Decision refers to the 1964 Judgment but not the 1973 Judgment. Instead， 
it refers to the GB judgment of 18 November 1962 (hereinafter the 1962 
Judgment). The 1962 Judgment and 1964 Judgment did not find unconsti-
tutionality of the legislation.26 
The difference， tosome degree， !ies in the differences in their conclu-
sion. The 1995 Decision found the Provision constitutional. Therefore， the 
criteria set as follows: 
It is intended to prohibit discrimination without a reasonable ground. 
Differentiation in the legal treatment on the ground of the difference 
in economic， social， and other various factual relations concerning 
individuals is not against this provision， insofar as the differentia-
tion is reasonable.27 
24 Judgment of the SCJ (GB)， 4 Apri11973， 27(3) Keishu 265， 26. 
25 Judgment of the SCJ (GB)， 27May 1964， 18(4) Minshu 676 and Judgment of 
the SCJ (GB)， 4 April 1973， 27(3) Keishu 265. 
26 Judgment of the SCJ (GB)， May 27 1964， 18(4) Minshu 676 and Judgment of 
the SCJ (GB)， 18November 1962， 18 (9) Keishu 579. 
27 Decision of SCJ (GB)， 5 July 1995，49 (7) Minshu 1789. 
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By contrast， the 2013 Decision found the Provision unconstitutional. lts 
criteria， hence， are described as follows: 
Article 14， paragraph (1) of the Constitution provides for equality 
under the law， and this provision should be interpreted as prohibit-
ing any discriminatory treatment by law unless such treatment is 
based on reasonable grounds in relation to the nature of the matter. 
This is the case law established by the precedent rulings of this 
court." 
If the 2013 Decision is based on the same criteria but reaches a differ-
ent conclusion， what accounts for this difference?29 The 2013 Decision 
emphasized that the matters to be considered (such as tradition， social 
conditions and public sentiments) change with time. Therefore， the rea-
sonableness of the rules should be subject to constant examination and 
scrutiny in light of the Constitution， which provides individual dignity 
and equality under the law. What matters， then， does the SCJ examine? 
The SCJ lists eight factors:30 
• Factor A: diversification of forms of marriage and family life and 
peoples' perceptions of marriage and family resulting therefrom; 
• Factor B: the legislative trends of other countries that have had an 
influence on the process of introducing the Provision in the past; 
• Factor C: international human rights treaties ratified by Japan， and 
criticisms raised by committees created under these treaties; 
• Factor D: changes in the legal system relating to the distinction 
between children born in and out of wedlock; 
• Factor E: preparatory legislative attempts to amend the Provision 
in 1979， 1996， and 2010; 
28 Thc 2013 Decision， supra note 14， 1-2. 
29 The 2013 Decision also admits the rcasonable discretion of the legislature as 
the 1995 Decision did. 
30 The 2013 Decision， supra note 14. 
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• Factor F: none of the factors， namely， wide prevalence of the ati-
tude to re叩町tlegal marriage， the actual number of children born 
out of wedlock (23，000 in 2011)， and the percentage of such children 
in Japan (2.2%) as compared to that in other countries， can be re-
garded as being directly associated with the reasonableness of the 
Provision: 
• Factor G: the existence of five dissenting opinions and concurring 
opinions each suggesting a disappearance of reasonableness of the 
Provision in the 1995 GB Decision and the individual opinions to the 
same effect in the following PB decisions and judgments; and 
• Factor H: that the necessity to consider consistency with related 
provisions cannot be the reason for maintaining the Provision auto-
matically. The supplementary nature of the Provision is not a ma-
terial factor in judging its reasonableness. 
How does the SCJ weigh these factors? The SCJ reveals that none of 
the changes on various matters (from Factors A to H) associated with the 
reasonableness of the Provision can be the sole decisive reason for judg-
ing the distinction of the Provision. Instead， the SCJ declared that by 
“putting al points mentioned above together， itmust be said that even in 
consideration of the discretionary power vested in the legislative body， 
the distinction in terms of the statutory share in inheritance between 
children born in wedlock and children born out of wedlock had lost rea-
sonable grounds by the time when P's inheritance commenced as of July 
2001 at the latest".l If Factor A is not a decisive reason， Factors B and C 
should play a sub唱tantialrole in reaching the conclusion of unconstitu-
tionality. They are not merely supporting factors. 
Moreover， the SCJ declared that respect for individuals in a family 
has been recognized more clearly.“Even if the legal marriage system itself 
is entrenched in Japan， itis now impermissible， as a result of such change 
in the recognition， tocause prejudice to children by reason of the fact that 
31 Ibid. 
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their mother and father were not in a legal marriage when they were 
born -a matter that the children themselves had no choice or chance to 
correct. Rather. it can be said that a notion that al children must be given 
respect as individuals and that their rights must be protected has been 
estab!ished".32 It must be noted that the SC] does not specify the constitu-
tional source for “respect as individuals" despite the fact that Article 13 of 
the Constitution clearly stipulates that “All of the people shall be re-
spected as individuals'¥Instead of exploring and refining the argument 
based on human dignity and its related human rights. the SC] looks to 
Factors B and C. Their significance is to be explored in the following 
sections. 
3. Use of Foreign Product 
The 2013 Decision is a breakthrough in terms of its use of foreign law 
and the international human rights treaty. Now itis time to consider why 
the SC] refers to foreign products in the 2013 Decision. There is a differ-
ence between the two sources. Foreign law does not bind ]apan in any 
sense. ]apanese people have no right to democratically influence the leg-
islative process of foreign countries. and there is no legitimate means for 
them to do so. On the contrary. the international human rights treaty has 
to be approved by the Diet. which represents the ]apanese people.33 When 
the ]apanese government is to ratify a treaty. it carefully checks the 
treaty's compatibility with ]apanese law. If the government finds a possi-
ble incompatibility but stil wants to conclude the treaty. it does so but 
with reservations. although the extent of these reservations can be con-
troversial. Once a treaty takes into effect. it not only binds ]apan but also 
has a domestic legal effect without legislation in ]apan， although whether 
a court can apply the treaty directly is another matter. 
The status of the regional human rights treaty. which ]apan may not 
32 Ibid. Emphasis is added by the author. 
33 S巴eArticles 73 and 43 of the Constitution of Japan. 
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join (for example， the European Convention on Human Rights) is inter-
esting to consider as it shares similarities to the UN human rights treaties， 
many of which ]apan ratified. 
The 2013 Decision refers to foreign law but not to foreign case law. 
On the other hand， the Decision refers to recommendations made by the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
but does not considcr whether the Provision is in violation of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and/or the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Therefore， reference to foreign case 
law and ful reference to the international human rights treaty remains a 
future issue. 
(1) The Use of Foreign Law and Case Law 
The propensity to consult foreign law and case law largely depends 
on the legal history (or western legal history) of the coun try. If coun try 
X has been a forerunner and developed its law on its own soil， itis not 
necessary for the country to consult foreign law. On the contrary， ifcoun-
try Y must introduce a set of laws (and a legal system as a whole) within 
a short period by urgent necessity due to modernization， independence or 
country rebuilding after war or civil war， or must transform the constitu-
tional system， itis advantageous to look to foreign law as a precedent. It 
is also interesting to note that once country Y imports foreign law， for 
example， the laws of country X (Jaw X)， and its case law maintain influen-
tial status even after country Y switches to the laws of country Z (Jaw 
Z).34 
]apan is a good example of country Y. ]apan first learned from the 
Continental Europe (particularly France and Germany) from the mid-
34 Furthermore， the exporter-importer relationship can be described as“a rela. 
tionship of subordination between the country borrowing and the country 
borrowed from， especially in the case of former colonial countries'¥Christa 
Rautenbach， South Africa: Teaching an ‘Old Dog' New Tricks? An Empirical 
Study of the Use of Foreign Precedents by the South African Constitutional 
Court (1995-2010)， inGroppi and Ponthoreau， supra note 7， 185， 186. 
?
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nineteenth century until World War I， and then looked to the United 
States as a result of the occupation by the American army and the radical 
reforms that it pursued or supervised. Hence， comparative legal study 
about not only the laws of the United States but also European countries 
such as Germany has been active in Japan and continues to be today. 
Among countries that transplant or borrow from foreign constitu-
tionallaw， there are int巴restingdifferences to be noted. In the case of an 
earlier importer like Japan， the Constitution of Japan does not mention 
anything about foreign law， and the SCJ does not explicitly refer to for-
eign case law. On the contrary， a more recently adopted constitution 
provides a guideline on how to interpret the constitution or bil of rights 
in the constitution. Moreover， the guideline itself is more open to foreign 
law. Section 39 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) famously 
provides: 
When interpreting the Bil of Rights， a court， tribunal or forum 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity， equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider internationallaw; and 
(c) may consider foreign law.35 
It must be acknowledged that the South African constitution is a 
triumph of national and international efforts to abolish apartheid. This 
globalized process has contributed to the present open attitude of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCSA). Justices of the CCSA ac-
knowledge the value of foreign case law and have “emphasized that the 
Constitutional Court will continue to consult foreign law in areas where 
constitutional principles have not been established."36 The CCSA delivered 
35 (http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/english-2013.pdu 
(visited 31 December 2013). Section 1 (2) of The Constitution of the Republic 
of Malawi allows a court to consult current norms of international law and 
comparable foreign case law. 
36 Rautenbach， supra note 34，193-194. 
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a total of 400 judgments with at least 2，742 foreign citations from 2005 to 
2010.37 Interestingly， the most popular foreign precedent for the CCSA is 
Canadian， as the drafters of the South African Bil of Rights drew signifi-
cant inspiration from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.38 
There is a parallel relationship between the Constitution of Japan and the 
Bil of Rights in the Constitution of the United States. However， the dif-
ference between drafting processes creates differing attitudes: a hidden 
attitude (Japan) and an open attitude (South Africa). Furthermore， there 
is a dialogue between the CCSA and the Supreme Court of Canada (SCA) 
as the SCA also refers to the South African case law. Here， the image of 
post-colonial country in monologue disappears.39 
One must not overlook the importance of the common working lan-
guage as English shared by the importer， South Africa， and its three most 
influential exporters: Canada， the United States， and the United Kingdom. 
Sharing the English language and a history of borrowing， facilitates one-
way or mutual exchange. On the contrary， itis necessary for the SCJ to 
translate foreign judgments into Japanese. Reading in English and other 
foreign languages is an extra burden for Japanese judges who currently 
face an already heavy workload. Another problem inherent of translation 
lies in the potential to create ambiguity or even the danger of producing 
a different concept， which judges certainly want to avoid. 
On the other hand， who would read and cite Japanese case law 
written in Japanese? Recently the SCJ started to publish an English 
translation of leading judgments and decisions on its website.'o This is 
appreciated from ihe perspective of transjudicial dialogue.'1 Furthermore， 
if the SCJ wants to establish a true dialogue (not a monologue)， itis nec-
essary to consider a style of writing that can facilitate clear referencing 
37 Ibid.. 194. 
38 Ibid.， 198. 
39 Ibid.， 186 and 198. 
10 (http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/indcx.htmJ) (visited 31 Decem. 
ber 2013). 
41 The French Constitutional Court (Conseil ConstitutioneJ) also provid巴san 
English translation of the judgment. 
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and citation. Even when the SCJ cites its own case law， itonly cites a case 
number and date. It does not specify which part of the iudgment or deci-
sion it is concerning. It would greatly improve the clarity and conven-
ience of dialogue if the SCJ introduced a paragraph number system. 
If obstacles to referencing are substantial for the SCJ， why does the 
2013 Decision refer to specific foreign laws， while not relying on its usual 
methods? The history of legal transplanting presents a good reason. The 
20日Decisionat first points out that during the deliberation of the amend-
ment of the Civil Code at the Diet in 1947， the existence of laws in other 
countries at that time， which made a distinction in terms of the share in 
inheritance between children born in wedlock and children born out of 
wedlock was repeatedly argued as the grounds for supporting the consis-
tency of the Provision with the Constitution.“This suggests that these 
laws of other countries had an influence on the process of introducing the 
Provision in the existing Civil Code.川 2 Therefore， when the SCJ examines 
foreign law， which had an influence on introducing the Provision， legal 
abolishment in the United States and European countries presents more 
than a supporting reason to admit a violation of the Constitution. 
Furthermore， the SCJ cleverly chooses the examples of Germany and 
France， which kept discrimination when the SCJ ruled the 1995 Decision， 
but later eliminated it， noting that no western country retains a distinc-
tion. 
At the time when the 1995 Grand Bench Decision was rendered， 
among the major countries where such discrimination stil existed， 
Germany enacted Erbrechtsgleichstellungsgesetz (Act on Equaliza-
tion of Succession Rights) in 1998， and France enacted Loi nO 2001-
1135 du 3 decembre 2001 relative aux droits du conjoint survivant et 
des enfants adulterins et modernisant diverses dispositions de droit 
successoral (Law No. 2001-1135 of December 3，2001 on the Rights of 
the Surviving Spouse and Children Born out of Wcdlock and Modern-
42 The 2013 Dscision， supra note 14， 4.
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izing Various Provisions of Inheritance Law) in 2001， thereby elimi-
nating discrimination in terms of the share in inheritance between 
children born in wedlock and children born out of wedlock. At pre-
sent， among the United States and European countries， no country 
maintains a distinction in terms of the share in inheritance between 
children born in wedlock and children born out of wedlock， as ]apan 
stil does. Thus， such treatment can be said as being rare on a global 
scale'.'3 
With this reasoning based on comparative analysis， the comparative 
aspect of the reasoning of the 2008 judgment can be fully re-evaluated. 
Furthermore， after the provision of Article 3， para. 1 of the Nationality 
Act was established， many states that had previously required 
legitimation for granting nationality to children born out of wedlock 
to fathers who are their citizens have revised their laws in order to 
grant nationality if， and without any other requirement， itis found 
that the father-child relationship with their citizens is established as 
a result of acknowledgement." 
It can be safely deduced from the 2013 Decision and 2008 judgment 
that if a foreign law influences the making or amending of ]apanese law， 
later changes in that foreign law can provide an opportunity for the SC] 
to reconsider the present ]apanese law. Moreover， the SC] attributes 
much importance to the change if a similar change has occured in most 
western countries. Whether the SC] will refer to foreign laws that ]apan 
does not directly transplant， such as the Canadian constitution that be-
comes popular in the recent drafting or amending process of constitu-
tionallaw， remains to be seen. 
43 Ibid.，5. 
44 The 2008 Judgment， supra note 10. Emphasis is added by the auther. 
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(2) Use of International Law and Case Law 
The Constitution of Japan does not specify the status of international 
law within the Japanese domestic legal hierarchy. Section 1 of Article 98 
prescribes that“This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation 
and no law， ordinance， imperial rescript or other act of government， or 
part thereof， contrary to the provisions hereof， shall have legal force or 
validity." A treaty is not included in this Section. On the other hand， 
Section 2 of Article 98 provides that “The treaties concluded by Japan and 
estab!ished laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.吋
There was once controversy over the issue of superiority: the Consti-
tution or treaty.'6 Presently the majority view and Japanese government 
position is that the Constitution of Japan is superior to a treaty.47 The SCJ 
permits the possibi!ity to review the constitutiona!ity of a treaty.48 It is 
also an established view that a treaty is superior to a statute and that 
international customary law is considered to have the same status as a 
treaty in Japanese legal system.'9 Therefore， itis theoretically possible to 
find a statute in violation of a human rights treaty. 
In rea!ity， the SCJ has been very reluctant to recourse to the interna-
tional human rights treaty， despite the fact that lawyers often refer to 
these treaties in court when they find a clearer and more detai!ed clause 
45 The original draft of this section was proposed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs， which believed it was important to sweep away past impressions of 
Japan that it did not observe treaties. See Kenzo Takayζmagi et al， Nihonkoku 
Kenpou Seitei no Katei 1I CYuhikaku， 1972) 281 and 282. 
46 Akiko Ejima， 'The Inf1uence of the International Codification of Human 
Rights upon the Codification of Constitution of Japan' (2013) 10 University 01 
Tokyo Joumal 01 Law and Politics 81， 91.
47 Th巴 Japanesegovernment accepts the existence of jus cogens. This is the 
answer of the head of the International Legal Affairs Bureau， Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs at the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence， 2 
June 2009. 
48 The Judgment of the SCJ (GB)， 16 December 1959. 13 (13) Keishu 3225 (The 
Sunagawa Case) 
49 Akira Kodera et al， Kogi Kokusaihou (Yuhikaku， 2010)， 125. 
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that would better support her or his argument. The typical attitude of the 
SCJ and of other lower courts with few exceptions is not to examine an 
international human rights treaty in detail and to not rule that domestic 
law is in violation of a human rights treaty. Instead， itis often declared 
that the treaty “should be regarded as having the same effect" [of the 
ConstitutionJ or that “each statute in question cannot be considered as a 
violation of the treaty" without reasoning.50 
However， the 2008 Judgment is again a herald for suggesting change 
at the SCJ. In a case where the constitutionality of the Nationality Act 
was questioned (the Act refused to grant Japanese nationality to a child 
born between a Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother， who were not 
legally married)， the SCJ referred to the ICCPR and CRC in addition to the 
legislative trends of other countries. 
In addition， itseems that other states are moving towards scrapping 
discriminatory treatment by law against children born out of wed-
lock， and in fact， the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child， which Japan 
has ratified， also contain such provisions to the effect that children 
shall not be subject to discrimination of any kind because of birth.51 
The 2013 Decision advances further by referring to not only the 
names of international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and the 
CRC but also recommendations made by the Human Rights Committee of 
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (HRC) and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (ComRC)， with explicit recommen-
dation in the early concluding observation of the HRC in 1993 and the 
latest concluding observation of the ComRC in 2010， both of which cal to 
50 E.g・， the judgmcnt of SCJ (PB)， 8 March 1989， 43(2) Minshu 89 and thc judg 
ment of SCJ (PB)， 7 September 2000， 19 Shumin 283. 
51 The 2008 Judgment， supra note 10. Emphasis is added by the author. 
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eliminate the discriminatory legislation.52 
1t is now clear that the SC] takes international opinions into account， 
which are provided periodically by international treaty bodies and which 
reflects changes in the international community. At present， there are 
comprehensive resources for international opinions because the ]apanese 
government is obligated to submit reports to the Human Rights Council， 
Human Rights Committee， Committee on Economic， Social and Cultural 
Rights， Committee on the Rights of the Child， Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination against W omen， Committee on Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination， Committee against Torture， Committee on Enforced 
Disappearance， and Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabili開
ties.53 Moreover， if]apan accepts the individual communication mecha-
nism that some of the aforementioned committees provide， their views as 
an outcome of individual communications becomes important material 
for the SC]， as they reflect similar judgments as those of international 
courts such as the European Court of Human Rights Chereinafter ECtHR) 
in that they are decided based on specific facts about the applicants. 
Taken into account the 2013 Decision， the SC] can refer the committees' 
views even before ]apan adopts the individual communication mecha-
msm. 
A remaining question is concerned with the relationship between the 
Constitution of ]apan and the international human rights treaty. The 
2013 Decision does not state this clearly. If the SC] continues to refer to 
concluding observations and recommendations Cand likely to the views of 
committees in the future)， this must be clarified to enable a constructive 
dialogue and to prevent the arbitrary use of a foreign product. The ati-
tude that involves using a foreign product when it is useful for strength-
ening reasoning but ignoring it when not useful or incompatible brings 
52 The Desision 2013， supra note 14， 5-6. 
53 Reporting status can be searched by country on the website of the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/一lay
outs!TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx) Cvisited 10 January 2014). 
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into question the legitimacy of foreign products usage as a whole. After 
al， neither the 2008 Judgment nor the 2013 Decision rules that the statute 
is against the treaty itself. 
4. Relationship between Foreign Law and International Law 
in the Field of Human Rights 
What kind of relationship exists between Factor B (foreign law) and 
Factor C (recommendation of international organizations) in the 2013 
Decision? In the 2013 Decision， Factors B and C appear rather complemen-
tary. In a general situation， however， which is more important in the 
SCJ's reasoning， would foreign law or internationallaw take precedence? 
In a situation where they are incompatible， which would precede? Theo-
retically an international human rights treaty that Japan ratifies may 
take precedence as it binds Japan. On the other hand， foreign law is liter-
ally foreign， which does not bind Japan in any sense. However， what 
happens in reality is somewhat different. After al， the SCJ in the 2013 
Decision picks up Factor B first and then goes to Factor C， instead of 
finding a violation of ICCPR and/or CRC. Factor B sounds morc influen-
tial because of the connection between Japanese law and German and 
French law. The reason why the SCJ takes into account recommenda-
tions from the HRC and ComRC is not clear. If the SCJ continues to make 
use of international opinions， itmust be clarified.54 Moreover， why the SCJ 
avoids examining violations of the treaties that the appellants' lawyer 
argued must be examined. 
The 2013 Decision contains an interesting interrelationship between 
foreign law and international case law. The legal revision of the French 
law， which the SCJ relies on as reasoning in the 2013 Decision， occurred 
because of judgments by the ECtHR， such as Marckx v. Belgium and 
Mazurek v. France. The ECtHR is a regional human rights court estab-
lished by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that is 
54 This is a next theme the author would like to explore. 
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comprised of 47 member states of Europe and 800 mi1ion people. Marckx 
v. Belgium is the leading case where the ECtHR found violations of Artic1e 
8 (right to private and family life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) 
of the ECHR regarding both an unmarried mother and her daughter con-
cerning the establishment of the daughter's maternal affiliation， the lack 
of a legal bond with her mother's family and her inheritance rights and 
her mother's freedom to choose how to dispose of her property.55 ln this 
case， the ECtHR looked to the legal trends of other European countries. 
It is true that， atthe time when the Convention of 4 November 1950 
was drafted， itwas regarded as permissible and normal in many Euro-
pean countries to draw a distinction in this area between the “ilegiti-
mate" and the “legitimate" family. However， the Court recalls that 
this Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day condi-
tions (Tyrer judgment of 25 Apri11978， Series A no. 26， p.15， para. 31). 
ln the instant ca日e，the Court cannot but be struck by the fact that the 
domestic law of the great majority of the member States of the 
Council of Europe has evolved and is continuing to evolve， in com-
pany with the relevant international instruments， towards ful juridi-
cal recognition of the maxim “mater semper certa est".出
When the ECtHR decides whether there is objective and reasonable 
justification on the side of the respondent state， or rather， whether a wider 
margin of appreciation should be given to the state， itis useful to survey 
the general tendency of the law of Contracting States. On this point， an-
other eloquent example is Christine Goodωin v. the United Kingdom con-
cerning the rights of transsexual people. The ECtHR held that there had 
been a violation of Artic1e 8 ofthe ECHR， owing to a c1ear and continuing 
international trend (not only in Europe but also Australia， and New Zea-
land) towards increased social acceptance of transsexuals and legal recog-
5 Marckx v. Belgium， judgment of 13 June 1979 (Plenary Court)， Ser. A， No. 31. 
56 Ibid.， para 41 
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nition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.57 Conse-
quently it changed from its previous position， that had allowed a wider 
margin of appreciation to a Contracting State.58 
This approach is reinforced in Mazurek v. France. 59 The applicant， 
born of an adulterous relationship， had his entitlement to inherit reduced 
by half because a legitimated child also had a claim to their mother's es-
tate， according to the law in effect at that time. The Court noted a clear 
trend in Europe toward the abolition of discrimination concerning chil-
dren in this applicant's situation. 
Today the member States of the Council of Europe attach great im-
portance to the question of equality between children born in and 
children born out of wedlock as regards their civil rights. This is 
shown by the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Chil-
dren born out of Wedlock， which has not been ratified by France. 
Very weighty reasons would accordingly have to be advanced be-
fore a difference of treatment on the ground of birth out of wedlock 
could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.60 
These cases offer a few examples to illustrate the interrelationship 
between ECHR case law and foreign or comparative law. Presently， the 
judgment of the ECtHR contains not only international documents but 
also relevant foreign laws that do not necessarily limit the laws of mem-
ber states of the ECHR. Particularly， when the ECtHR has to deal with a 
new issue， itoften thoroughly reviews the relevant comparative and in-
57 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom， judgment of 1 July 2002 (Grand 
Chamber)， Reports 2002-VI， para. 84-85 and 93. 
58 See Rees v. the United Kingdom， judgment of 17 October 1986， Series A no. 106; 
Cossey v. the United K仇gdom，judgment of 27 September 1990， Series A no. 184; 
x.， Y. and Z. v. the United Kingdom， judgment of 2 Aprill997， Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions 197-I; and Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom， 
judgment of 30 July 1998， Reports 1998-V. 
59 Mazurek v. France， judgment of 1 February 200. 
60 lbid.， para 49. This is comparable to the “strict scrutiny" test in Japan. 
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ternational materials. S. and Maゆerv. the United Kingdom presents an 
example of a case regarding the indefinite retention of the applicants' 
fingerprints， cel samples， and DNA profiles in a database after criminal 
proceedings against them have been terminated by an acquittal in one 
case and discontinued in another case; the ECrHR deemed this a violation 
of the ECHR. In this case， the ECtHR inc1udes not only relevant domestic 
law and materials (e. g.， England and Wales， Scotland and Northern Ire-
land) but also relevant national and international materials covering the 
Council of Europe Convention of 1981 for the protection of individuals 
with regard to automatic processing of personal data， law， and practice in 
the Council of Europe member states， the directive of the European Union， 
case law of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.61 In other words， the ECtHR compares not only be-
tween foreign laws but also between foreign law and internationallaw. 
The ECtHR's affinity with comparative law is understandable as a 
regional human rights court， given that the ECtHR has to interpret an 
open-ended document which is considered a “living instrument" by the 
ECtHR itself. This is particularly true when the ECtHR addresses a new 
question such as the appropriate use of a DNA database by police when 
there is no consensus among member states. 
ECtHR case 1aw， therefore， ispotentially influential for Japanese 
courts. 1 would like to rcturn to the fact that the French legal revision， 
which was an SCJ reasoning (Factor B) in the 2013 Decision， was brought 
forth by the Mazurek judgment. This denotes an indirect but noteworthy 
dialogue between the Japanese Court and the ECtHR. Apart from the 
judicial dialogue， an extra-judicial dialogue can be a1so identified. Justices 
of the SCJ have a regu1ar opportunity to visit the ECtHR and vice 
versa.62 On one of these occasions， Justice Izumi visited the ECtHR and 
met the then President Costa in 2008. They exchanged views on the issue 
of legal discrimination of the child born out of wedlock and Justice Izumi 
61 S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom， judgment of 4 December 208. 
62 Luzius Wildhaber， the then President of the ECtHR visited the SCJ in 203. 
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was informed of the European situation， wherein the discriminatory legis-
lation had existed in France， Belgium and Austria but the nationallegisla-
ture had abolished it because of the judgments of the ECtHR.63 One may 
recall that Justice Izumi wrote a dissenting opinion twice in the SCJ PB 
decisions. More recently， Mr. Costa also visited the SCJ following retire-
ment， meeting with a Justice at the SC]. During their discussion the Jus-
tice spoke about the 2013 Decision， and mentioned the Mazurek case. 
At the lower court level， there have been some cases where a local 
district court andjor a high court has admitted the plaintiff's argument 
partially on the basis of the ICCPR and even on the basis of ECHR case 
law (particularly Golder v. the United Kingdom and Silver v. the United 
Kingdom)， and awarded the plaintiff compensation.64 
Scrutiny of the 2013 Decision with the 2008 Judgment shows that 
dialogue between a national court and an international body Cincluding a 
court in an indirect sense) does occur. This dialogue has the potential to 
create a sphere in which comparative and international considerations are 
hybridized to adress a specific issue， such as the protection of the child 
born out of wedlock. 
Conclusions 
The article reaches three broad conclusions. Firstly， the Supreme 
Court of Japan has finally shifted its attitude from non-reference to refer-
ence (clear reference to foreign law in order to fortify its conclusion). The 
2013 Decision together with the 2008 Judgment presents a possibility for 
the SCJ to establish a transjudicial dialogue. Secondly， the SCJ's reference 
to foreign law and international human rights treaties creates an opportu-
nity to offer a new sphere where foreign law and international human 
63 Tokuji Izumi， 'Kongaishi Souzokubun Sabetsu Kitei no Iken Kettei to “Kojin 
no Songen'" (2013) 849 Sekai 229， 231. 
64 Conversely， the Supreme Court denied th巴violationsof the ICCPR without 
explanation and ignored the argument based on ECHR cas巴law.Judgment of 
the SCJ (PB)， 7 September 2000， 19 Shumin 283. 
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rights treaties are hybridized. Thirdly and last1y， some questions and 
problems remain: the legitimacy question of foreign jurisprudence， the 
question of the relationship between foreign law and iniernational human 
rights treaties， and the question of methodology. 
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